This article examines how the British government sought to recruit the BBC in its propaganda activities concerning the Spanish Civil War and in particular to 'quieten' domestic public opinion about the conflict. It also considers the extent to which the Corporation acceded to government demands and concludes that, despite areas of cooperation and even complicity, there were also putative signs of editorial innovation and independence in the BBC's news service. In the disquiet this created in official circles, the Spanish Civil War presaged many future conflicts between public broadcasters and governments about the coverage of international crises (7976 words)
British government adamantly opposed French actions and threatened to withdraw from mutual security agreements. The subsequent Non Intervention Agreement was conceived by the Blum government as an alternative strategy for diffusing international tensions and inhibiting the extension of fascist and communist influence in the region, but it was Britain that nurtured it and promoted it most assiduously, not least through its hosting of the meetings of the international Non Intervention Committee whose principal role was to prevent arms and volunteers from reaching the warring parties. And even when evidence grew of the ineffectiveness of the policy, the response of the British government was seek to bolster rather than abandon non intervention through the introduction of effective frontier and sea patrols and prohibiting the dispatch of foreign volunteers.
A core part of the government's strategy for achieving military isolation of the war was to contain discussion of its wider political significance and symbolism. Throughout, senior officials sought to cool the ardour of public debate and deny the wider international and ideological ramifications of the conflict. They believed effective management of the mainstream media was crucial for achieving these objectives, in part because of the prevalent, and largely untested, assumptions at the time about media influence. As Tom Buchanan notes:
In the 1930s 'public opinion' was conventionally regarded as being the public view of opinion-formers, who interpreted the sentiments of their voiceless fellow-citizens. Considerable power was seen to reside in the editorial columns of leading newspapers, especially The Times -hence the attempts by government to manage their views on sensitive issues like appeasement. Public opinion was not an entity to be scientifically tested, but rather an amorphous public morality, to be interpreted and moulded by politicians and journalists (22) Buchanan makes no reference to the BBC, but there is no doubt that the In his complaints to the Cabinet, Eden was concerned about 'quietening' domestic opinion in Britain, a point reiterated in official communications during this period. However, the government was also mindful of how British news content was received abroad and wanted to avoid situations where negative or provocative material might exacerbate international tensions. In this respect, official concerns were particularly focused on the BBC and The Times.
The reason The Times featured so prominently was only partly due to its international status. It was widely recognised that the paper's editor, Geoffrey Dawson enjoyed privileged access to the senior echelons of government and identified 'not so much with the Conservative interest as the ministerial mind' (Koss 1008) . For this reason, it was assumed in foreign embassies across the world that close scrutiny of the paper's leader columns would give a clear indication of the direction of British government thinking. This was an important consideration for the BBC as well, as the principles of public broadcasting, in which a state funded media corporation retained significant autonomy from government control, was still a novel and imperfectly understood concept in the 1930s, especially in the Fascist states where the BBC was seen as the official mouthpiece of the British government (Haworth). But, as shall be shown, this wasn't the sole reason why the BBC figured so prominently in government calculations.
The government's news management strategy on Spain between 1936 and 1938 was mainly organised and implemented via the News Department of the Foreign Office, headed by Sir Reginald 'Rex' Leeper. The department was the sole survivor of the major dismantling of the government's propaganda apparatus that occurred in 1918 and, having survived on frugal resources for many years, was at the vanguard of attempts in some official circles to stimulate a resurgence of state investment in communication as international tensions grew ). The propaganda model conceived by Leeper and his colleagues at the Foreign Office aimed to address international and domestic opinion in a distinctive way. In promoting the values and virtues of an 'open' political system internationally, they sought to avoid the brashness, aggression and instrumentalism that typified the propaganda of 'closed' totalitarian systems. Emphasis was placed instead on 'cultural propaganda' designed to foster awareness and appreciation of British institutions and values, rather than to deprecate competitors or enemies. These values also infused the news management strategies developed by the Foreign Office, which encouraged factual and measured debate of international matters rather than impassioned and partisan commentary (Willcox: 107) .
In terms of domestic opinion, the Foreign Office's plans were more didactic. Just before the rebellion in Spain, Leeper outlined plans for a campaign 'for the education of the public' on foreign affairs using the press, the BBC, the League of Nations Union 'and perhaps the churches'. He wrote:
We have to rearm our people not only materially, but morally. . . We must concentrate not only on our rearmament, but on bringing other nations to our side and by instilling in them such confidence in our leadership and determination that they too will rearm and abandon an attitude of defeatism vis-à-vis Germany. But if we are to inspire them with this confidence, education must begin at home. We must be swift, bold and persistent. It is insufficient to make a few public speeches for the News Department of the Foreign Office to make points with the press. I suggest the whole programme must be conceived on wider and bolder lines if it is to bear fruit and to bear fruit quickly ii The BBC was expected to play a vital and distinctive role in this ambitious project.
Leeper set out his vision in a report in April 1937 on his consultations with senior BBC managers:
What seemed to me to be required, I told them, was that the BBC should deal with the subjects that really mattered to this country and should thereby try to get the public thinking on sensible lines. I suggested therefore a meeting with Sir R (Cockett, 1990: 79) While Fascism and Communism were regarded in the Foreign Office as the 'mumps and measles' of world society, the former was believed to be an urgent but short-term problem; the latter a longer-term one, which in consequence was never quite out of view, and especially in regard towards France and Spain (3) Foreign Office news management over Spain operated through two means -routine, offthe-record briefings of senior diplomatic correspondents and high level consultations with senior editors, managers and proprietors. In the former, Leeper often spoke with candour about Foreign Office concerns, which marked a departure from the suspicious stance traditionally adopted by the Foreign Office towards journalists. As Cockett notes, ' [Leeper] realised that with a certain degree of flattery, openness and coercion, the diplomatic correspondents could be welded into a cohesive body who would always put the Foreign Office view in the press' (74).
Most journalists in Leeper's cadre represented 'up market' newspapers, revealing the Foreign Office's principal concern with elite opinion formation, both domestically and internationally (Adamthwaite: 282) . As noted, the BBC was considered to be as at least as important in opinion formation as these organisations, but despite this, Leeper's lobby was not a direct element in official management of BBC content for two reasons. First, these arrangements were intended to shape the news agenda, rather than respond to it, through the strategic release of factual information and unattributed comment. But the BBC was not a significant newsgathering organisation during this period. During the 1920s and early 1930s, the news services provided by the BBC were limited, a lowly and marginalized aspect of the Corporation's 'Talks Department'. It was only in 1934 that the news and talks department became formally separated, and although staffing of the news department increased significantly between 1935 and 1939, 'the department was only beginning to discover the methods and routines of news gathering and presentation when war was declared' (Scannell and Cardiff 105) . This meant that the BBC news service was almost entirely dependent on news agency material for its content during the civil war. (The sole exception came in January 1939 when Richard Dimbleby travelled to the FrenchSpanish border to report upon the plight of Republicans refugees fleeing Nationalist advances .) This news-processing function was, of course, important and required the Foreign Office News Department to remain in 'almost daily' contact with the BBC on the material used. Nevertheless, Leeper acknowledged this was largely an ex post facto process, different from the agenda-building function of the diplomatic lobby:
News comes into the BBC from agencies up to the last minute and we have to rely on the judgement of the BBC staff as to what is broadcast by them. When they are in doubt they telephone to us and we advise them, but very often they may have no doubts where they ought to have them. The Foreign Office cannot under existing arrangements do more to check the news bulletins than is being done at present iv Second, the BBC remained accountable formally to government, for all its emerging independence of spirit, and there were strong institutional mechanisms in place by which ministers and officials could exert influence on editorial content directly, at the highest levels.
Some historical analyses of BBC-government relations during this period appear to suggest that Foreign Office control was easily achieved. For example, Haworth writes of the 'old guard rectitude', 'staid respectability' and 'unimaginative trustworthiness' that permeated the senior echelons of the BBC at the time (Howarth: 51-2). However, reading the accounts given by senior officials at the time, one is struck as much by their exasperation at getting the BBC to accede to their wishes, as their confident expectation of success. Part of this was due to longstanding and increasing tensions between the government and broadcasters that were starting to boil over by the time the civil war broke out. Although ministers and officials frequently paid lipservice to the principles of BBC independence, in practice they were vexed by what they perceived as unnecessarily contentious coverage. Their most acute concerns in this respect were the BBC 'News Talks': programmes in which selected public figures were invited to contribute comments on topical issues.
As has been widely discussed elsewhere, the government made several complaints about the content of particular talks before the civil war began. shows too much partiality to Franco?' (ibid.). By 1938, the pressures on the News Department were so intense that R.T. Clarke, the department's senior news editor, confronted the new Director General, Cecil Graves, to demand that the attacks on "his boys" should stop. It is claimed that Clarke was nearly sacked for his insubordination, only being saved by a supportive petition from news room staff (Dimbleby 84).
The only way of appraising the validity of these accusations of partiality against the BBC, as well as looking for evidence as to whether external pressures, official or otherwise, inhibited the News Department's editorial response, is to look in detail at the BBC's actual coverage of the war at the time. This investigation begins with an analysis of BBC Home news reports on the Spanish Civil War broadcast for the entirety of 1938. The time frame for this sample is dictated by the limited availability of written records on BBC Bulletins xiv but in many ways the timing is propitious for the purposes of this analysis, as it falls well after the Vansittaart-Reith meeting. If the Foreign Office pressure had strategically affected BBC news reporting, these changes would be evident in coverage produced during this sample period.
Home News
In 1938, Home News bulletins ran 1558 news items on Spain, which represents an average of 4.26 news items per day. The frequency of coverage varied month by month, with the most intense period falling in June and the least in September (see figure 1) . It is only possible to speculate the reasons for the latter, but it may be pertinent to note that this was the month of the Munich crisis, which ended with the British Prime Minister conducting crisis talks with Adolph
Hitler in a bid to avert a pan-European conflict over Czechoslovakia. 
Notes: one principal theme was identified for each news item. Percentages=number of themes in each category/ total number of news items coded. All percentages above 0.5% are rounded. Totals may not add up to 100. Table 1 These political ambiguities in the BBCs editorial responses were also evident in the reporting of non-intervention and intervention in the conflict. On the one hand, the regular and descriptive reporting of the decisions of the Non Intervention Committee could be said to have legitimated its authority and effectiveness. On the other, nearly as much coverage was given to evidence of, or claims made about, material contraventions of the policy, and which the BBC continued to report even after the supposed success of the NIC's Withdrawal of Volunteers scheme (e.g. 'Bonnet on Ribbenthrop's statement on 3,500 German volunteers in Spain', 14/12/1938). The amount of coverage given to this topic is also remarkable when contrasted with its scant treatment in cinema newsreel coverage at the time. As Aldgate explains all the major newsreel companies of the day tended to avoid the topic for most of the war because of the uncomfortable questions it raised about the efficacy and equity of the policy (Aldgate 121, 130, 155, 157, .
News Talks
Alongside consideration of the content of these bulletins it is also significant to note the amount of coverage that the BBC continued to give to Spain in 1938, in spite of the length of the hostilities (which had an attritional effect on coverage in other news organisations) and the government's stated wish that the topic not be unduly emphasised. The enduring news value of Spain through 1938 for the BBC was also evident in the number of 'News Talks' produced by the News Department, whose number for this year exceeded those for 1937 (23 to (Southworth, 1977; 1999) . Archibald Lyall had used his review of On the Nationalist side, Edinger described how strange it felt not to join in the Fascist salutes to
Franco at the mass rally he attended. Fourth, although all contributors avoided overt politicising about the war, in the main emphasising personal experiences and impressions, it was not difficult to draw ignificant political implications from what was described. Both Phillimore and Lyall's pieces portayed Nationalist Spain as well governed, well ordered, and well fed, and Phillimore's piece ended with his personal impressions of the modesty and humility of Franco following their meeting. In contrast, Langdon Davies and Cockburn's pieces both acknowledged the desperate conditions and suffering in Republican Spain, while at the same time paying testament to the equanimity, endurance and thirst for education of the ordinary people whose lives they described.
Conclusion
The broadcast journalist Jonathan Dimbleby once described the BBC's coverage of the Spanish Civil War as 'perhaps the most shameful example' of its News Department's 'timidity' during the 1930s:
It became plain to some in the News Room that there was a huge discrepancy between the techniques which were used to cover the insignificant, and those that were used for what mattered: in the one the craft of the radio reporter was allowed to grow, in the other it was forbidden (Dimbleby 82) According to Dimbleby, it was only with the arrival at the BBC of his father, Richard
Dimbleby, in the late Thirties that things began to change, starting with his ground-breaking broadcasts from the French-Spanish border at Le Perthus, which described the tragic exodus of To do so, they expected the BBC to eschew traditional news values and subordinate their professional aspirations to the national interest (as defined by the Foreign Office). Events in Spain intensified these expectations, as international tensions worsened and the unpopularity and ineffectiveness of the government's non intervention policy became ever more apparent.
the broadcast service continued to give prominence to the war for its duration, despite official preferences otherwise, and in doing so often fore-grounded information that was inconvenient to those favouring Franco, or at least seeking to assuage pro-Nationalist opinion (e.g. the coverage of the Nationalists' indiscriminate aerial attacks and their contraventions of the nonintervention agreement). The continued commissioning of news talks on Spain is also remarkable, as these had proven to be a particularly sensitive source of contention with the Foreign Office for several years. The choice of authors for these news talks can also not be seen as conservative and 'safe', as many were known to have strong opinions about the war and some had attracted controversy for them.
I contend that the Spanish Civil War proved a watershed for the BBC News Department, creating conditions ripe for the emergence of a new professional model of broadcast journalism, of which Richard Dimbleby was to be one of the first and influential exponents. Old practices proved outmoded in reporting Spain. In particular, the complete reliance on news agencies for factual reports from Spain only highlighted the deficiencies of these sources. The information flow was uneven, material sent was sometimes contradictory, and it was often difficult to determine the veracity and value of the material received. Moreover, in the processing of this information -deciding what to ignore and what to report -the News Department could not avoid political controversy, inviting allegations of pro-Republicanism and pro-Nationalism in equal measure. These would have provided a powerful incentive for the News Department to seek more self reliance in its news gathering, to impose their own quality standards on the material produced. Although ambitious plans mooted during the period for the creation of a strong cadre of BBC foreign correspondents were not realised in the 1930s, they established a vision for the future development of BBC news provision (Briggs 158) . The continued commissioning of news talks should also be seen as tentative steps towards the realisation of this more active editorial voice.
There is a need to be cautious about overstating the extent to which the BBC resisted government pressure at this time. For example, the 'propaganda with facts' favoured by the Foreign Office connected with many of the core BBC editorial values that were being formulated during the interwar years. For the battle for the BBC news service during this period
was not just about establishing the terms and conditions of their independence, but also about defining a distinctive professional vision for their news service. This involved reconciling an adherence to facticity and impartiality with a commitment to 'serving the nation' and extolling the British democratic way (Scannell and Cardiff) .
Whether the BBC's coverage of the Spanish Civil War galvanised or quietened public concerns in Britain about the events in Spain is difficult to determine on available evidence. At the very least, the BBCs sustained interest in reporting the war helped maintain its prominence in public consciousness. What is beyond doubt is the disquieting effect the BBC's editorial response to Spain had on British officials, who in attempting to exercise control were forced to confront uncomfortable lessons about the BBCs growing reluctance to accept these limits unquestioningly. The Spanish Civil War provided the first sustained realisation for an emergent public broadcast news service that the interest of officials and the public interest are not necessarily reconcilable, and in the modest attempts made by broadcasters to assert a degree of editorial independence the seeds were sown for a series of intensifying clashes in the post war xi On 8 th February 1937, Sir John Reith signed a detailed written response to a letter from the Conservative MP Victor Cazalet that had alleged the BBC was 'unfair' to Franco. In rejecting the claims, Reith said that an in-house investigation of Home news for January 1937 showed that the ratio of items beginning with Republican and Nationalist sources was 13 to 10, respectively; whereas the proportion of agency material received from Republican, neutral and Nationalist sectors was 6, 3 and 1.
xii The Republicans controlled the international telephone lines for the majority of the war and it took several months for the Nationalists to secure any access to the international cable system . xiii BBC's alleged Bias: Spanish News, Manchester Guardian, 10/2/1937: 14 xiv Before December 1937 the bulletins were drawn verbatim from agency material, so no detailed records were kept xv Manchester Guardian, 19/3/1938: 14 
